

Processes of Strategy Formation: 1993-2008

A Historical Overview of the Governor's Crime Commission



Governor's Crime Commission

Criminal Justice Analysis Center

March 2009

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Processes of Strategy Formation: 1993-2008

A Historical Overview of the Governor's Crime Commission

Executive Summary

The North Carolina Governor's Crime Commission (GCC) is a strategic planning body and is continually involved in formulating criminal justice strategy. This study seeks to better understand how strategy has been formulated by the GCC to help the transition to a new administration. The theory of strategy by Henry Mintzberg (2007) is used as a basis to describe strategic formation and the various organizational structures that make it possible. This study takes a historical look at the past 15 years of two administrations: Gov. James B. Hunt from 1993–2000 and Gov. Michael F. Easley from 2001–2009 to understand the major influencing factors on the strategic process. Senior staff were interviewed about the history of their standing committees, how the granting process works, and how it figures into the strategic formation of issues and priorities for GCC attention and resources.

Historically, the major factors shaping the Governor's Crime Commission are the shifts in funding and a change in philosophy from punitive (strengthening the criminal justice system), to prevention (offering services ahead of the crime and criminal cycle). While these influencing factors shape strategy, the strategic process grows from the life cycle of federal block grant fiscal administration. Commissioners and staff are involved in a continuous conversation about what is important, initiatives and priorities, and how best

to address those needs with programming. The strategic process never ends and flows from one year to the next seamlessly building on the expertise of commissioners and staff and the decades of experience serving as the lead advisory body for criminal justice matters in the state.

The study reveals that the commission has a viable and vibrant strategic process which is deliberate and emergent (Mintzberg 2007) in that strategic vision leads to planning and action. As the commission is both dynamic and flexible, this embodies Mintzberg's taxonomy of the various organizational structures necessary to devise and execute strategy. The commission is an *entrepreneurship*, for example, when it takes strategic vision from state or federal leadership. It is a *machine organization* as grant fiscal administration is highly technical and compliance requirements are complex. It is a *professional organization* as planners and researchers must be knowledgeable of their respective fields. It is an *adhocracy* as standing committees frequently reconstitute into ad hoc groups to address concerns of the moment. The commission is by every measure a productive progressive entity, and a mark of such an organization is its ability for introspection and improvement.

Introduction

The Governor's Crime Commission serves as the chief advisory body to the governor and the secretary of the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety on crime and justice issues. GCC administers the federal pass through block grant funds for criminal justice,

juvenile justice, and victims' services awarded to the state of North Carolina. Governor's Crime Commission Chair Linda W. Hayes has served in this capacity since 1995.

The Governor's Crime Commission has 44 members, including heads of statewide criminal justice and human service agencies; representatives from the courts, law enforcement, local government and the General Assembly; and private citizens. Federal block grants are awarded each year to government, education and social service agencies to start new and innovative programs in Criminal Justice Improvement, Crime Victims' Services and Juvenile Justice. The commission also houses the Criminal Justice Analysis Center which has the responsibility for conducting policy relevant research and evaluation to inform and advise North Carolina leadership and citizens on criminal justice matters.

Strategy is a large part of what the commission does. Commissioners, via their assignments to three committees, meet quarterly with staff to determine granting priorities and major issues, make granting decisions, and suggest legislative actions; strategy is a part of every meeting. It is important to have a grasp of the strategy process. To do that, this study will use the methodology and typology of strategic formation outlined in *Tracking Strategies: Toward A General Theory* (Mintzberg, 2007).

There will be insights from understanding GCC's major strategic positions, primarily via legislation and initiatives taken by North Carolina leadership or the federal Office of Justice Programs (OJP), during the periods from 1993 to 2000, and from 2001 to 2008, and discussing them according to the strategic process theorized by Mintzberg. Thus,

this study will consider how the GCC forms strategy for arriving at programming (grant funding) decisions, initiatives, and policy and program development priorities.


A Brief History of the Governor's Crime Commission

The Governor's Crime Commission began as a direct result of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. This federal legislation created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which channeled federal monies for the states to improve criminal justice systems, providing each state would establish a formal state planning agency (SPA). North Carolina then created the Law and Order Committee. This original manifestation of the Governor's Crime Commission was set up within the Division of Community Assistance and the Department of Economic and Natural Resources to eliminate conflict of interest in the granting of funds. The Law and Order Committee was changed to the Law and Order Commission in 1975 because it was given larger regulatory power to give and take grants away.

In 1977, the Law and Order Commission was restructured by Gov. Hunt into the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. This brought selected law enforcement agencies and entities, such as the State Highway Patrol, National Guard and Victims and Justice Services, within one department. With the new department, the Governor's Crime Commission was mandated by statute (§CH 143B-477) and assembled. This statute created six GCC planning subcommittees: Crime Prevention and Public Information, Law Enforcement Planning, Judicial Planning, Corrections Planning,

Juvenile Justice and Juvenile Code Revision. While the committee structure has evolved, GCC still functions as the criminal justice system planning agency for the state.

Chronology of Major GCC Events



Since 1993 some significant influencing factors and events have shaped the current structure and functioning of the commission. Most of these had to do with funding (see the chart above). From about 1993 to 2001 federal funding remained relatively stable, as block grant monies from the OJP had some predictability. After 2002, federal funding began to decline. The commission had to target funding and consolidate committees. The six planning sub-committees which existed prior to 1990 were changed by the mid 1990s to the Drug Control and System Improvement, Information Systems and Technology, Juvenile Justice Intervention and Prevention and Victims committees to reflect the needs of the time.

Committee structure and purposes varied over time depending on issues and criminal justice system needs. In the early 1990's the predecessor of the Criminal Justice Improvement committee (CJI), the Drug Control and System Improvement Committee, split with the creation of the Information Systems and Technology Committee. The significance of the IT Committee was that it made automation systems, mobile data, and universal communication amongst criminal justice stakeholders a priority for policy and funding. Internally, the IS committee was a platform for introducing a grant scoring matrix which helped commissioners be as objective as possible while selecting grants. They had a tool to numerically objectify a very subjective process. With it they could understand how effective a project may prove to be and discuss the merits of project selections with fellow commissioners. The matrix was then adopted by the other standing committees. In 2003 the DCSI and IT committees were combined into the present CJI committee mainly to reflect the reduction of Justice Assistance Incentive Block Grant and Byrne/Justice Assistance Grant, which eventually led to a 67 percent reduction of funds for CJI projects. The reductions led to smaller dollar value projects to support more department level operational needs with less latitude for experimentation on new ideas.

The two Juvenile Justice (JJ) Committees, Intervention and Prevention, were merged in 2000. This merger reflected a change in the JJ committee granting policy toward more services provision for juveniles involved in the JJ system along the continuum from intake through aftercare. Because of funding requirements, the JJ Committee is separated

into the Child Abuse and Neglect (CA&N) and Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) subcommittees. Funding from Health and Human Services enabled projects that improved processes for CA&N cases, and in order to qualify for Title II funding from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, a DMC function had to be formally established and staffed.

Victims services in the early 1990s sought to improve the criminal justice system's capacity to better serve victims of crime via Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) funds. Via VOCA, the committee sought to improve the delivery of victims' services. Both goals required increasing input by experts and practitioners who participated in the Victims Committee meetings. Leadership combined VOCA and VAWA functions under one umbrella in the mid 1990's to better address programming needs for crime victims by creating the current Crime Victims Services Committee.

Funding for good ideas to promote community safety and security has always been austere. The commission has only funded about a quarter of proposals submitted even before 2001 when funding was stable. When funding started its dramatic decline about 2001 there was heightened pressure to find innovative ways to 'do more with less.' One such idea was with the blending of funds from committee to committee. At one time the JJ Committee had gotten as much as \$1.2 million in Justice Assistance Grant monies from the CJI committee. This, with the emphasis on strengthening JJ systems and prevention, allowed greater leeway for the JJ Committee to fund mentoring, structured

day, after school and multi-jurisdictional programs for juvenile treatment programs. The blending idea continued throughout the second half of the study period.

Top-down state strategic leadership from the Governor's Office and the General Assembly was significant during the two periods of study. Gov. Hunt set clear priorities in the early and mid 1990's. First it was safe schools, then it was confronting (street) crime via community policing. GCC used this strategic vision to make dramatic improvements in school safety mainly via community policing embodied in School Resource Officers. Hunt also called for a special legislative session to deal with crime issues. The commission responded by funding projects that improved community safety and security, particularly with community policing efforts, and by strengthening the criminal justice system with projects to enhance voice interoperability between criminal justice entities.

With the change of administrations, strategic direction and priorities changed. The emphasis was on education and in particular on alternative learning programs. The commission began working in earnest on projects to improve out-of-school programming along the continuum from preschool to juvenile day reporting centers for older youth. With this emphasis and the significant reductions in funding, the commission struggled to promote criminal justice issues, according to senior staff. Probably, the best example of strategic direction and mutual collaboration from the General Assembly was on addressing the growing gang presence in North Carolina. The commission heralded the problem with a seminal gang study in 1999 and its follow-up in 2004. Subsequently, the

General Assembly enacted legislation in 2006/2007 to fund gang intervention and suppression projects. The commission, in turn, monitored the distribution of funds and reported back to the General Assembly on the status of projects. These efforts prompted another round of state funding for gang projects.

Overall, GCC committees complemented each other during this period of study. Where funding requirements allowed, ideas for funding went to the committee best suited to start the grant, especially with the decision to ‘blend’ funds in 1999. The CJI committee served a purpose as a ‘catch all for gaps in services,’ according to the lead planner. It focused on relatively small grants, from \$10,000 to \$15,000, to fund critical (operational) projects which made significant differences in services provided. The JJ Committee saw that, wherever possible, funding decisions in the Crime Victims Services (CVS) and CJI committees considered juvenile issues and needs especially where improvements to the larger criminal justice system were concerned. Likewise, the CVS Committee advocated for victims and collaborated with the other committees to promote more collaboration between the major criminal justice entities, especially with prosecutors, law enforcement and courts. Together the committees have been a major force in strengthening services and the criminal justice system in North Carolina while advocating via policy, legislation and programming for children and youth, victims of crime, and the major entities — courts, correction and law enforcement — of the entire criminal justice system.

Methodology

This study began with extensive interviews conducted with senior planners for each of the committees, the deputy director of Policy and Program Development, and the executive director (see Attachment 2: Interview Questionnaire). The interviews explored the historic purpose of each committee and how each committee and its granting, policy and program development formation processes have evolved. Interviewees were encouraged to comment on how their committee fits in North Carolina criminal justice. Initiatives from the Office of Justice Programs and the state were discussed and listed from 1993 - 2008.¹ These periods were selected to provide some perspective on strategy process from one gubernatorial administration to another and from one legislative long session to the next.

The granting process was then discussed to determine whether there are nuances from committee to committee, how the process has changed, what roles granting stakeholders exercise and how they arrive at granting decisions. The granting process was explained in relative detail because the formation of initiatives and priorities were a logical outgrowth of making programming decisions.

Initiatives were a focus of study since it is from major initiatives that program and funding priorities arise.² Interviewees were encouraged to discuss the strategy process

¹ Year 2009 initiatives were not included since they were drafted by the Commission at the time of this writing.

² The distinction was made between initiative, priority and project. The initiative establishes the overall vision for what needs to be accomplished. For example, a major priority of Safe Schools is to make the classroom a safe environment conducive to learning via community policing. From that priority, the major project, or granting area, was School Resource Officers.

which leads to initiatives, how initiatives have evolved from 1993, how the process of initiative formation has changed, what prompted those changes, who established them, how they were addressed and what results may have accrued. Respondents were then asked who established their initiatives and how funding/programming priorities were addressed. A similar line of questioning was followed for understanding funding priorities (or purpose areas).

Data were mainly developed from interviews to understand the major processes of GCC operations as the state (block grant) pass-through agency and understanding the chronology of major GCC events since 1993. This information was analyzed according to the strategy process and dimensions discussed below as outlined in Mintzberg (2007):

Dimensions of Strategy- Definition, Process, Organization, and Roles

According to Mintzberg (2007) strategy (p. 341) is defined as: *plans* for the future, *patterns* out of the past, *positions* on the ground and *perspectives* in the abstract. The process of strategy formation comprises *intentions*, *continuation* (of strategies realized), *tactics* (based on ground truths) and *theory* (of strategy development). It is based on deliberate plans surrounding clear if sometimes novel visions (p. 346) where the atmosphere is entrepreneurial and on emergent patterns that form out of individual actions (p. 4).

Strategy evolves through four processes (p. 341):

- *Planning* – Devising *deliberate* plans about tangible positions

- *Visioning* – Devising a *deliberate* plan as a broad perspective
- *Venturing* – Identifying *emergent* patterns which become tangible positions
- *Learning* – Identifying *emergent* patterns that result in broad perspective

The strategic environment is understood according to the means of the organization to fulfill a defined strategy. Mintzberg (p. 342) describes the four basic forms of organizations:³

- *Entrepreneurial* – Controlled by a single leader
- *Machine* – Technocratically controlled. Found in stable environments (like the public sector)
- *Adhocracy* – Organized around teams of experts organized in matrix of talents defined by the problem/project at hand to produce novel outputs in dynamic settings
- *Professional* – Compliance oriented for services provision

The data from interviews and understanding major events was described using Mintzberg's (2007) terms to understand the strategic process, determine themes for how decisions are made concerning establishing initiatives and priorities, then the subsequent programming to accomplish them.

³ No organization displays the pure definition described by Mintzberg. While an organization may manifest most of the characteristics of a category, characteristics from each of the defined categories can be found in any organization.

GCC Dimensions

Commission strategy formulation concerning initiatives which lead to priorities for programming was mainly influenced by the philosophical approach to criminal justice issues and the vagaries of funding. Funding reflects two distinct periods, before and after 2001. Before 2001 funding was largely predictable, as there was more latitude to experiment with different ideas to improve the criminal justice system. While state funding increased mainly to confront a growing gang presence, funding was substantially reduced after 2001 due to the overall reduction of block grant funds from OJP.

The GCC as the State Block Grant Pass-through Agency

The commission has traditionally employed a cyclical granting process driven by the flow of monies from OJP. Certain administrative requirements have to occur during the life cycle of funding to distribute, manage and close those awarded grants.

Understanding the granting process is important because the granting cycle and its strategic formation results directly in shaping initiatives and priorities.

Priorities for funding were established as derivatives of major initiatives from state leadership, especially the governor and secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety. In the early and mid 1990's, Gov. Hunt set the strategic direction by announcing that his administration would focus on safe schools *and* back that defining vision with political and monetary support. GCC then set about determining areas where its limited funding could demonstrate the most promising ideas. School Resources Officers, for example, were determined by practitioners and GCC-sponsored research to be a singular factor in

making schools safe. Next, the commission solicited project proposals. These proposals were then analyzed by the commissioners using a weighted scoring matrix which objectified the selection of projects that had the most potential to address the needs of the initiative and target populations.

When the selected grants were approved by the governor, they were awarded in July of the granting cycle which ends the awarding process. Grants were then monitored during the grant period for fiscal compliance and accomplishment of stated goals. Projects which seem to have the most promise are noted to the commission for continuation or replication. The next section will offer a review of the committee specific processes used to arrive at initiatives, priorities and programming.

The Granting Process – Why and How It Developed and Changed

The best way to describe how the granting (strategic) process works is to describe committee dynamics according to the granting cycle which comes in quarterly milestones dictated by the flow of funds from the OJP. While strategic formation and granting are seamless from year to year, the granting cycle of making programming decisions formally begins as the previous cycle transitions from awards to fiscal management. During the first quarter (June) funding priorities are discussed and narrowed by each committee. In September, they are formally adopted by the Commission. After that, announcements are made to the eligible grantees of funds availability and grant writing workshops are conducted. Proposal submissions are closed out the last working day in January when the pre-applications go through a series of rigorous qualifying and

selection processes. Staff and then commissioners review these preapplications from February through mid-March to arrive at a list of the most promising projects. Those selectees are asked to submit a full application. After a final compliance check by staff, the final list of full applications is recommended to the secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety (CC&PS) and the governor for final approval. Funding announcements are made for projects to begin the first of July when the next cycle begins again. The committees have a similar strategic process based on planning, analyzing what works, developing data from and with practitioners, and application of current theories about how strategy is done (Mintzberg 2007).

Commission standing committees have similar processes for arriving at the June draft priority statements based on a combination of top-down directives for priorities by state leadership, by those required by each category of funding, and bottom up triangulation of experience, data and experiential (practitioner/expert) presentations. It must be mentioned that GCC appointees are specifically chosen for their expertise, experience and key position. As a body they are the most well-informed group on criminal justice in the state. The CJI committee serves as an example of cross-committee priority formation. The CJI committee chair and staff prepare by listing the priorities from the OJP then drafting possible foci from the continuous study of data (crime trends), field visits by staff to all current projects, and the experiential knowledge of what needs are emerging as is done in the CVS and JJ committees. Throughout the year, practitioners and interest item experts make presentations to the three committees and to the entire commission during quarterly meetings. As in the case of the JJ committee chair, he

channels a continuous stream of information to staff and commissioners throughout the year. If there is a weakness in strategy formation, as expressed by senior staff, it is in the lack of commission-sponsored, targeted, North Carolina specific research because of a lack of resources.

The September quarterly meeting is usually done in a two day retreat format to allow the strategy formation process to work for a final definition of priorities (and a draft legislative agenda). The final choices of priorities are a result of intense and lively give and take. The priorities are then posted on the Web for the October announcement and request for proposals. During this time the scoring weights and criteria are ‘tuned’ if need be, to reflect the discussions (see Attachment 3: Grant Scoring Matrices). Below is an example of how the CJI Committee weighs the merits of gang grant proposals, which exemplifies the manner in which the other committees define and use the grant scoring tool:

Meets Priority	Risk/Threat	Suppression	Prevention	Intervention	Collaboration
Yes or No	0-10	0-15	0-25	0-25	0-25

Notice how each criteria reflects what is important to the funding area in terms of quantifying what the funds are actually supposed to accomplish in the community. These criteria are further quantified by suggesting categories for each of the criteria; for example: 0-3 points = Low Crime Risk; 4-7 points = Moderate Crime Risk; 8-10 points = High Crime Risk.

This system of objectifying a subjective process evolved. In the early 1990’s staff ranked grants with a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not qualified and 5 being qualified.

Commissioners then discussed and finalized the rankings as they do now but without the benefit of a weighted scoring tool. While commission discussions have always been detailed and focused, when the commissioners are involved by having to categorically judge the merits of a project, discussions elevate to issues and the few projects which are re-ranked due to qualitative factors. Also, in the early 1990's the CC&PS secretary was quite involved in making the final selection of projects.

The matrix began its evolution in the mid 1990s with several purposes in mind. Staff needed to make more technical decisions about the qualifications of a proposal, the commissioners needed to be better prepared to make proposal recommendations, and the secretary (and governor) needed to be confident in the objectivity of decision making. Furthermore, the matrix system allowed Commissioners an avenue to recuse themselves from scoring a proposal for any reason. The system is still evolving as the matrix ranking process is labor intensive especially for the commissioners. Ways to reduce time commitments while preserving objectivity are being considered.

During the fall, the commission conducts grant writing workshops where fiscal and programming requirements are outlined. Each committee, via assigned staff, conducts break out sessions to relate their specific requirements for funding to inform potential grantees on the nuances of constructing a good proposal.

The intensity of priority selection continues to the actual grant selection process which extends from February through mid-April. Pre-applications are screened by staff for

compliance and eligibility and are pre-qualified for review by the Commissioners.

Everything is done electronically now which is a huge improvement in efficiency from the 1990s when stacks of pre-applications had to be copied for each commissioner, a job which continued through weekends and consumed cases of paper products.

Commissioner scores are automatically aggregated to a master list for each Committee which ranks the proposals for funding. It is that ranked list which is discussed and adjusted in each committee to arrive at a list which is then sent to the “war room.” The war room was coined to reflect the intensity of the final proposal selections by the chair, committee chairs and selected senior staff that adjust or blend funds to maximize the number of priority projects that are funded. The respondents on the list are then asked to submit full applications with modifications suggested by commissioners and staff if needed. These processes are procedurally similar from committee to committee since they are standardized by the scoring tool and the granting life cycle. These recommendations are formally accepted by the commission then forwarded to the secretary and governor for final approval, awards are announced, after which, grantees can begin drawing funds the first of July.

How has the granting process evolved since the early 1990’s? It has become automated and objectified. In the early 90’s all granting and record keeping was done manually.

Any questions from anyone for specific information, especially about a priority area, were difficult and laborious to answer; staffers would have to surround themselves with stacks of grant folders to tease out responses, which, in retrospect to automated capabilities, were cursory. Automation was essential. In the early to mid 1990’s the

commission and its assigned information systems engineer began work on a grants automation system, the Grants Management System (GMS), which became unique in the nation. With GMS, grants were submitted, scored and awarded largely on line. More importantly, fiscal reports such as how funds were disbursed throughout the state and how much was being spent by priority were easily produced. Also, just about any relative question could be queried and answered with GMS. Efficiency soared. GMS enabled staff to automate nearly the entire granting process which not only increased efficiency, it also increased the reliability and accuracy of the vital fiscal requirements of managing public funds. The Governor's Crime Commission became known as the 'go to' agency for grants management.

Objectification happened with the scoring matrix, which resulted in Commissioners being intimately involved in granting decisions and being able to debate the merits of individual projects. It has also increased the responsibility given to staff to determine the technical merits of a proposal. This left more time for commissioners to deliberate the nuances of issues and policy. Discussions on programming became more detailed, informed and based on relevant data all prompted by the need for objectivity. Before the CVS committee consolidated VOCA and VAWA responsibilities, granting decisions were heavily influenced by non-voting, advisory members. Granting recommendations are now made only by appointed commissioners via the scoring tool. As decision making improved, so did processes and policy recommendations. The overall critique of the objectified, automated granting process, according to senior staff, was to 'close the loop' of making a recommendation, for example for a grant, and ensure that it became self

sustaining in the community *and* improved a social condition. In summary, the basic strategic process of getting to a funding decision has remained largely unchanged as it is dictated by the granting cycle and funding requirements from the OJP while it has become more objective and efficient.

Developing Initiatives and Priorities – The Process, Why and How They Developed and Changed

While the cycle of funding progresses, each committee works on developing the initiatives and priorities for the next year. Strategies for funding, initiatives and priorities are formed from the same process; all three develop together, driven by the granting cycle. Senior staff note that the conversation is continuous, and more important, they observe that these processes are more data driven than reactionary as they had been during the earlier years of this study. The JJ committee process of initiative formation exemplifies how the other committees form their initiatives.

Commissioners begin by identifying issues which may be new or continuing. Initiatives and priorities are prescribed top down by funding organizations and state leadership and, bottom up, by the Commission with significant experiential consideration from the field. Major issues take shape as more data, expert advice and practitioner experience is sought and digested. Possible solutions are offered for discussion. Decisions are made on how best to address the few major issues that define the committee's direction for the pending granting cycle. Models are also assessed for applicability in the North Carolina criminal justice environment. Where applicable, they are piloted and evaluated for suitability for

further replication after modification based on trends and data from test sites. This all ends in a strategy of funding guided by the most accurate statement of guiding initiatives derived through ‘conversations’ that sometimes continue for years.

The JJ committee also ranks grant proposals by listing its priorities according to funding priorities. For example, the current JJ ranked list of priorities is:

- A. Services to address Disproportionate Minority Contact in The JJ System - Title II funds, prevention emphasis
- B. Delinquency Prevention Through Skills Training and/or Vocational Programs - Title II funds, prevention emphasis
- C. Community Based Intervention Services for Youth Involved with Gangs, Abusing Substances or in Detention – JABG funds, emphasis on court involved youth and Title IV with emphasis on community based intervention/prevention programs
- D. Improved Response for Child Victims of Maltreatment – Children’s Justice Act funds, emphasis on improving (criminal justice) systems for child victims of abuse and neglect

The JJ committee arrived at this list by a process of listing about 20 priorities which were distilled to the above four, shaped by top-down directive (OJP and state leadership) and bottom-up (practitioner) needs, again exemplifying what happens in the other committees. The philosophy that guides these strategic formations, according to senior staff, is one of ‘steering projects’ according to directives and state needs.

The CJI committee has been concerned with the North Carolina gang problem during the latter part of this study; the process of addressing gangs is illustrative. Data are under constant review. Staff have a continuous flow of qualitative and quantitative input from survey data, the strategic assessment from OJP on drugs and crime, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and especially Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) projects. The original study on the status of gangs in North Carolina, done by the commission's Criminal Justice Analysis Center, provided the 'tip' that there was a serious gang presence in the state. The research partnerships with PSN illustrate the cooperation/collaboration the commission has with researchers. PSN researchers tracked crime trends from all three federal districts in North Carolina which was shared with the commission. North Carolina specific information, national data and practitioner input was triangulated to provide a scientific basis for the discussions on how the committees and the commission as a whole could respond to the growth of gangs in the state.

Another similarity between committees is the use of data driven (pilot) programs. The CJI Committee is replicating the High Point Gang Reduction and the Gang of One projects. These experiments are being watched particularly because they have demonstrated dramatic reductions in violent crime, gun incidents and youth related crime, just as they were designed to do. They have the essential elements of fundable ideas, replicability and proven impact on the community. Similarly, the JJ committee has been developing Dual Jurisdiction Improvement programs which focus on improving juvenile justice systems processes.

Committee lead staffers agree that strategic formation since the latter 1990's has been more proactive rather than reactive and sought to "fix the processes (of dealing with crime and victimization) before involvement in the criminal justice system happens." Initiative formation and subsequent programming recommendations are moving from a punitive/suppression philosophy to one of answering how the criminal justice front end (prevention/intervention) can be strengthened.

While the commission's philosophy evolved from a punitive to preventive direction, there was a tendency to 'be all things to all people,' according to senior staff (refer to Attachment 1: Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society for a discussion of this within the GCC's legislative agenda development). This led to dilution of granting options away from advocating for and developing ideas to funding smaller and more operational projects, which is also exacerbated by funding reductions which are felt at the community level by concurrent reductions in basic services. That is, there was more pressure to fund a small grant for an underfunded JCPC or a local police department, for example, than there is for a larger promising pilot project. Then there are unintended consequences. The JJ committee noticed that when law enforcement capability at schools increased, so did juvenile arrests. Those juveniles were largely suspended or expelled from their regular schools with no suitable way to continue their education. The Department of Public Instruction commission representative noted that, yearly, hundreds of thousands of school days were lost to suspended and expelled youth, which is an unrecoverable classroom deficit and a predictor of further institutional involvement. Probably of most concern to commissioners and senior staffers is that

determining the “return on investment,” of projects that is, measureable improvements in the community, is practically impossible yet vital to decision making.

Staff comment that the period prior to 2001 was characterized by more experimentation without the depth of debate on what works that occurred with more intensity after 2001. Processes are more staff driven in that staff do much of the preliminary work of gathering data, selecting and preparing for presentations to the committee, and doing initial vetting of ideas to allow commissioners to “discuss the fine points of policy and strategy then make decisions.” This focus is exemplified by the recent programming to reduce methamphetamine labs in Western North Carolina. In 2005, law enforcement recorded 625 labs in Western North Carolina; by 2008 only 28 were recorded, according to the State Bureau of Investigation. Committee work, according to senior staff, is more harmonious because Commissioners are better prepared than they were before 2001. Furthermore, there is the pressure of reduced funding, and the elevated focus on issues/programming that can make a difference in the community, on the front end of the crime and criminal cycle.

Overview of GCC Major Initiatives Since 1993

Table 1: Timeline for Major GCC Initiatives: Strategy Process and Organizational Function

Year	Initiatives	Priority/Project	Strategic Process/Organizational Function
1993	Safe Schools	School Resource Officers	Deliberate/Entrepreneurial
1995	CJIN	Voice Interoperability Mobile Data Network	Deliberate/Adhocracy
1997	Community Policing	Social Work and Police Partnerships Geographic Info Systems for Small Law Enforcement Departments	Emergent/Adhocracy
1999	Juvenile Justice Reform	Establish DJJDP Code Revision Juvenile Crime Prevention Councils	Deliberate/Entrepreneurial
	Victims' Rights	Statewide Area Victims' Information Network	Deliberate/Entrepreneurial
2001	Reduce Number of Suspended & Expelled Youth Out of Educational. Setting	Out of School Programs Structured Day Programs	Emergent/Adhocracy
2003	Drug Trafficking Interdiction	Meth Lab Reduction	Emergent/Adhocracy
	Homeland Security	Training	Deliberate/Entrepreneurial
	Disproportionate Minority Contact	DMC Pilot Projects	Deliberate/Entrepreneurial
	Victims' Rights	Victims' Compensation	Deliberate/Entrepreneurial
2005	Confronting Gangs	GangNet	Emergent/Adhocracy
	Addressing Needs of At-Risk Youth	Funding Juvenile Crime Prevention Councils	Emergent/Adhocracy

Processes of Strategy Formation: 1993-2008 - A Historical Overview of the GCC

Year	Initiatives	Priority/Project	Strategic Process/Organizational Function
2007	Alternatives to Incarceration	ReEntry Pretrial Service	Emergent/Adhocracy
	Preventing Child Abuse & Neglect	Child Medical Exam Programs Child Advocacy Centers	Emergent/Adhocracy
2009	CJ Data Integration		Emergent/Adhocracy
	Raising the Juvenile Age		Emergent/Adhocracy

Major initiatives over the years of this study have led to results beyond what are implied by the above chart. The JJ Committee has spearheaded Juvenile Justice reform as seen in the formation of the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and code revision. It has begun closing the gap in services for juvenile delinquency by sponsoring out of schools programming and it has shifted the focus from reactionary to preventative. The CVS Committee has been the primary advocate for crime victims' reform especially for female victims of domestic violence. The CJI Committee has been, according to senior staff, the most influential body in the state for criminal justice reform, building capability and effecting safety and security in our neighborhoods. For example, sponsoring school resource officers (SROs) in the 1990's has resulted in the placing of upwards of 700 trained SROs in the state's schools. The SROs help improve school safety and make for a better learning environment. The CJI committee has also led work on communications interoperability via the Criminal Justice Information Network and legislative funding, it was responsible for implementing the first statewide projects to confront gangs. All three committees are poised to continue the work of strengthening the criminal justice system in North Carolina, defining the next initiatives and leading the action to make a difference.

Analyzing the commission's grant selection process through a Mintzberg (2007) framework reveals a strong entrepreneurial period during the early 1990s with a more subjective grant review and discussion session opening up the possibility that one or two individuals could dominate debate and recommend funding for their preferred pre-applications. Indeed during one year a former secretary of Crime Control and Public

Safety, overrode the commission's recommendations and hand picked many pre-applications himself. When the use of the grant scoring matrix became common practice, and pre-application review was quantified and made more objective, a shift occurred with the strategies here taking on more of what Mintzberg (2007) would describe as an organization having the attributes of both the professional organization and the adhocracy type of agency. Committee discussions, lead by a standardized rank-ordered scoring system, became more democratic with more input and participation by the committee members. Grant pre-applications were recommended through a formal vote with a greater probability of attaining consensus.

The period from approximately 1998 forward marked a focus on problems, issues and program priorities. Consequently, the committees collaborated much more closely by funding projects which were of most importance to the commission as a whole.

Prevention was key, thus funds were devoted to making the processes of juvenile institutions, such as juvenile court and detention work more efficiently. More emphasis was put on programs that worked ahead of the crime and criminal cycle by funding, such as school readiness programming. VOCA funds were used to fund programs dealing with juvenile victims or Byrne Drug Control and System Improvement funds were allocated to after school programs for at-risk teens. In effect, committees worried less about how much money they had and more about identifying promising and exemplary pre-applications.

The development of major initiatives appears to have followed a deliberate strategic process during the 1990s with top down directives being provided by the Governor's Office, such as safe schools, with staff and commission members filling in the gaps with priority development and corollary grant funding (Refer to Table 1: Timeline for Major GCC Initiatives: Strategy Process and Organizational Function). This mimics Mintzberg's (2007) umbrella strategy where senior level executives set the outer parameters and encourage and permit lower level staff and management to complete the picture using a combination of deliberate and emerging strategies. Strategy formulation shifted in the early part of the current decade from being deliberate and top down to more of an adhocracy with staff and commission members driving or steering the development of major initiatives which were then communicated up the chain for endorsement. This mimics Mintzberg's (2007) slinky effect, but in reverse. Imagine the slinky climbing up the stairs versus down. Strategy formation also became more emergent during this period as declining federal funding created an environment in which smaller initiatives were identified and addressed almost on an ad-hoc basis as unpredictable funding from year to year precluded large scale initiatives by way of deliberate strategy formulation. It is extremely difficult to plan major initiatives without stable funding and certainly frustrating to start an initiative one year only to discover inadequate monies to sustain the initiative the next.

Conclusion

This study reveals that the N.C. Governor's Crime Commission is in a strong position of leadership as the pass-through agency for the state, as the lead advisory body for the state

on criminal justice matters, and as an incubator for ideas to confront the significant crime and justice problems of the future. The strategic process works because of the informed, intense involvement of staff and the commissioners. Since the commission has to be dynamic and fluid and anticipate and address the trends and needs of criminal justice and the community, it uses Mintzberg's processes (p. 341) of how good strategy should work. Likewise it adapts its organizational structure (p. 342) strategically according to the need of the moment.

First of all, considering strategic formation, the standing committee structure, according to funding, is functional and lends itself to deliberate planning about tangible positions as a broad perspective, which, according to Mintzberg (2007, p. 341), is planning and visioning. The standing committees frequently subdivide into ad hoc groups of commissioners and stakeholders to address more specific problems such as the CJI committee reconstituting a smaller group to address data integration. This fits Mintzberg's theory about the venturing and learning organization that conceptualizes emergent patterns which are then shaped into tangible positions. The strategy process at the commission is efficient and effective at determining overall plans for issue and problem responses.

Concerning Mintzberg's typologies, the commission does not neatly fit into a particular organizational category specified by Mintzberg (p. 342) but adopts characteristics of each depending on how a body of talent needs to be assembled, which is an advantage. Rigid structures would not be nimble enough to address concerns of the moment. It is

entrepreneurial by taking strategic direction from the governor and OJP or exercising leadership by defining strategic directions. It operates machine-like in its technological approach to granting. Its committee structure allows for ad hoc teams to be assembled according to the strategic/operational need at hand. It fits Mintzberg's description of the machine organization in its execution of the fiscal responsibilities of grants administration and it is also professional as staff must be knowledgeable of their respective fields, because staff develop ideas, become experts in their areas and then advise commissioners. Its strengths are in the composition of the commission, a continuous process of strategy formation for defining initiatives, priorities and programming. Having funds to address a wide range of defined needs — especially emergent needs — and experimentation with ideas is unique among governmental agencies. It is by every measure a productive entity, and a mark of a dynamic organization is its ability for introspection and improvement.

The Governor's Crime Commission is uniquely poised to make significant improvements in North Carolina criminal justice systems and community safety and security. The most pressing strategic initiatives lie in prison reform, juvenile age reform, the difficulties of suspended and expelled youth, and data integration. The commission's healthy and dynamic strategic processes are the foundation for this work.

References

Garland, D 2001, *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Mintzberg, H 2007, *Tracking Strategies: Toward A General Theory*, Oxford University Press Inc., NY.

Attachment 1: Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society

In the Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, David Garland (2001) presents an insightful analysis of the criminal justice system and the state's crime control apparatus over the course of the last century with the main emphasis focusing on two historical periods. The modern period, in which the author primarily discusses the 1950's and 1960's, and the late modern period which encompasses the 1970's through the end of the century.⁴

Prior to the 1970's system practitioners were committed to the rehabilitative ideal with the operations, policies and daily practices of the criminal and juvenile justice systems reflecting this ideology. The focus was on the offender and decisions were made in the offender's best interest with an emphasis on individualized treatment and case based processing. Policing was reactive with no targeted patrols and there was less concern for minor or nuisance offenses which were typically handled informally and extra-legally. Judicial officials had far greater latitude and discretion in sentencing decisions with prisons being viewed as a last resort for the most severe and violent offenders; offenders received indeterminate sentences, which were often tied to treatment, and were eligible for early release or parole.

Research and criminal justice experts guided and shaped the system with significantly less legislative involvement and little, if any, expressed concerns coming from the general public. Crime was viewed as a social problem with program development targeting the root causes in the community and society at large. Garland refers to this period as the penal-welfarism era which directly parallels what criminologists refer to as positivistic criminology which places more emphasis on the offender, versus the criminal act, treatment and reintegration and a belief in social determinism versus individual free will.

During the 1970's, and more intensely during the 1980's, the system began to undergo a profound transformation or reconfiguration which was inexplicably tied to social, political and cultural changes occurring across the country.⁵ The criminal justice system fell into disfavor and was perceived as part of the problem and no longer as the solution. Crime, and the fear of crime, became commonplace or routine and viewed as just a part of everyday life.

Policing became proactive with targeted or directed patrols guided by geographic information systems and hot spot analyses. Crime prevention through environmental design and neighborhood watch programs became the norm. Surveillance cameras and

⁴ While the text was published in 2001, the author insinuates, and recent legislative and policy developments confirm, that many of the system attributes described or subsumed under the culture of control model persist today; a period that many social commentators refer to as the postmodern period.

⁵ The author elucidates the following as significant catalysts: globalization and the free market economy, changes in the family and household structure, the effects of television and the media, advances in transportation, technology and communications, changes in the social ecology of urban areas and the democratization of social and cultural life.

notification systems were deployed as well. Collaboration between criminal justice system agencies and private and non-profit agencies developed in response to the belief that the state could no longer solely provide adequate law and order maintenance. The new buzz words and theories were risk management, cost-benefit analysis, punishment, routine activities and rational choice.

Judicial officials lost discretion through determinate sentencing structures and complex guidelines or matrices. Habitual felon and three strike legislation spread rapidly as well as the belief that prison works with offenders receiving longer sentences and experiencing longer stays in custody as well with the abolition of parole. Community sanctions fell into disfavor also which only further exacerbated overcrowding in correctional facilities.

Legislators, victims and members of the general public became more vocal and critical of system operations with their input taking greater precedence over the knowledge of criminal justice experts and practitioners. The rational use of research and data was displaced by often irrational opinions and expressive anecdotal and horrific case stories now shape important policy decisions (Garland 2001).

During this period, which Garland describes as a culture of control, the offender has become vilified and stigmatized as an outsider or other who freely chooses a criminal lifestyle and deserves the maximum amount of punishment when apprehended. Victims' rights, intelligence systems and concern for public security now supersede any concern for the offender; indeed to speak of treating offenders became taboo much like discussions of punishment, incapacitation and preventive incarceration were during the penal-welfarism era. This period parallels the classical school of criminology which focuses on the crime and not the offender, punishment at the expense of treatment and discounts sociological explanations on the causes of crime.

Attributes of both of Garland's descriptive periods can still be found today but the author would argue that culture of control features are more prevalent and far outweigh the practices and policies of penal welfarism. This section presents an analysis of the Governor's Crime Commission's biennial legislative agendas within Garland's framework by categorizing its recommended agenda items as either being oriented to the goals, objectives and elements of a culture of control or conversely as possessing more of the ideals of penal welfarism. The number of items falling into each category will be analyzed in an effort to discern any significant trends or shifts in commission funding over the course of the last 10 years.

Methods

Before the beginning of each long session of the General Assembly the Governor's Crime Commission compiles a legislative agenda which outlines its proposals for reforming, enhancing and strengthening the criminal, juvenile and victim services systems. These proposals may require legislative action, policy development or revisions or the creation of new and innovative programs. Copies of the commission's legislative

agenda publications were obtained and analyzed to categorize all proposed items for the years 1997 through 2007.

To further categorize each year along the penal-welfarism/ culture of control continuum a G-score or factor was calculated using the following formula.

1 = 75-100 percent of grants or legislative agenda items are penal-welfarism and 0-25 percent are culture of control then the year is defined as being heavily weighted toward penal-welfarism.

2 = 51-74 percent of grants/items classified as penal-welfarism and 26-49 percent are culture of control then the year is classified as being primarily penal-welfarism or approaching culture of control.

3 = 50 percent penal-welfarism and 50 percent culture of control then the year is classified as neutral.

4 = 49-26 percent of grants/items classified as penal-welfarism and 51-74 percent classified as culture of control then the year is classified as primarily culture of control or as slightly crossing into a culture of control.


5 = 75-100 percent of grants/items are culture of control and 0-25 percent are penal-welfarism then the year is classified as being heavily weighted to a culture of control.

Results

Table 2: GCC Legislative Agenda Proposals and Initiatives (1997-2007)

Year	Total Items	Culture of Control Items	Percent of Total Items	Penal-Welfarism Items	Percent of Total Items
1997	45	25	56%	20	44%
1999	37	18	49%	19	51%
2001	20	8	40%	12	60%
2003	20	14	70%	6	30%
2005	4	2	50%	2	50%
2007	23	9	39%	14	61%
Total/Average	149	76	51%	73	49%

Figure 1: Percent of Legislative Agenda Items by Category



As Table 2 and Figure 1 reveal, the 2003 legislative agenda contained the greatest percentage of culture of control recommendations with 70 percent of the total proposals matching Garland’s model. The 1997 agenda was the second most control oriented with 56 percent of the items matching this descriptive category. The fewest culture of control recommendations were found in the 2001 and 2007 agendas with 40 percent and 39 percent respectively. Conversely, penal-welfarism recommendations were more prominent in the 2007 and 2001 agendas and least pronounced in the 1997 and 2003 agendas. Penal-welfarism and culture of control recommendations were more evenly balanced in 1999 and 2005. Indeed, across the entire 10 year period of recommendations the Commission has produced a well balanced agenda series with the percentage of culture of control recommendations (51 percent) almost being perfectly congruent with the percentage of penal-welfarism type recommendations (49 percent).

Table 3: G-Score Rating by Year (1997-2007)

Year	Percent Culture of Control	Percent Penal-Welfarism	G-score
1997	56%	44%	4
1999	49%	51%	2
2001	40%	60%	2
2003	70%	30%	4
2005	50%	50%	3
2007	39%	61%	2
Trend Average	51%	49%	4

Figure 2: Number of Years by G-Score




Table 3 and Figure 2 present the G-scores for each year and document the fact that the Commission did not have any extreme outliers or years which were strong or heavily weighted to either penal-welfarism or a culture of control. Legislative agenda items were more oriented to penal-welfarism for three years with one year — 1999 — approaching neutrality or crossing over into a culture of control. Two agendas, 1997 and 2003, were more oriented to promoting a culture of control with the 2003 agenda nearly moving into being characterized as possessing strong or high culture of control overtones with 70 percent of its recommendations being categorized as control related items. Across the ten year trend the commission’s 149 legislative agenda recommendations can best be described as almost neutral or possessing slightly more culture of control type items (51 percent) than penal-welfarism recommendations (49 percent).

Discussion:

As a general rule the GCC’s recommended legislative agenda items, during the last decade, have remained in a centrist position with only one substantial deviation or fluctuation in 2003; a year in which 70 percent of the legislative recommendations can be categorized as possessing the attributes of Garland’s culture of control model. Recommended legislative agenda issues during this period included a proposal to begin mandatory fingerprinting for all misdemeanants, a call for more prison construction and a recommendation to modify the state’s structured sentencing grid. Additional items that could be construed as fitting Garland’s model included expanding the state’s criminal justice information network, enforcing compliance to provisions of the victims’ bill of rights as well as funding the state’s automated victim notification system.

Attachment 2: Interview questionnaire

GCC Major Initiatives – 1993-2007 The Processes of Strategy Formation Interview Questionnaire

This study, designed by CC&PS Deputy Secretary, Jon Williams, is to better understand how strategy has been formulated by the GCC to help the transition to a new administration. It covers the past 15 years of two administrations: Governor James Hunt from 1993 – 2000 and Governor Michael Easley from 2001 – Present.

Considering the requirements from Secretary Williams please be as specific as possible when considering these topics and questions. He is looking to understand major periods of change and how the Commission/Department dealt with them, especially via the strategy process. Any written documentation will be appreciated especially where it comes to detailing specific initiatives by year and by committee.

This questionnaire is only a point of departure. For your convenience this will be a face-to-face interview, written responses are not required, but you can make notes beforehand. And we can do this questionnaire in sections at times that are convenient for you.

Thanks

I. *Basic data* – JJ, CJI, CVS committees

- a. Overview of Commission – The study seeks to identify the major periods of change, how they emerged, and how they were dealt with.
 - i. Comment briefly on the historic purpose of your Committee and how it has evolved.
 - ii. How does the GCC (committee) fit in NC criminal justice
 - iii. List the major initiatives (e.g. *Safe Schools* is an initiative, SROs are a tactic, or project of *Safe Schools*) for ***each legislative long (odd year) session*** from:
 1. The *Feds*
 2. The *State* – The Governor, CJ stakeholders
 3. The *Department* – The Secretary
 4. The *Commission*From:
 5. 1993 – 2000 (*Hunt Admin*)
 6. 2001 – Present (*Easley Admin*)

- II. *Dimensions* describe the processes used to address the major initiatives the Commission dealt with. Understanding dimensions helps determine how strategy was formulated, conducted, and realized (or not).
- a. Pass-through functions as dimensions
 - i. *The granting process* –
 1. What is your granting process?
 2. If the process has changed, what caused the changes, how have the changes affected the process?
 3. What are the roles of the stakeholders (people or groups who determine grant funding decisions)?
 4. How do stakeholders arrive at granting decisions?
 - ii. Initiatives (e.g. *Safe Schools* is an initiative, SROs are a tactic, or project of *Safe Schools*. Initiatives are the overarching strategy which guides granting and project development. There may be only one or more major initiatives per year, or one that extends for many years)
 1. How does the strategy process (devising a plan from a broad perspective) figure into establishing initiatives
 2. How have initiatives evolved, from 1993?
 3. If the process has changed, what caused the changes, how have the changes affected the process?
 4. Who establishes them?
 5. How are initiatives addressed?
 6. Comment on results from addressing initiatives.
 - iii. Funding priorities (purpose areas) - (Priorities/purpose areas fit between initiatives and projects. E.g. JAG purpose area = law enforcement programs, may contain a project to do a Crisis Intervention Team. The initiative may be to reduce prison over population).
 1. How are funding priorities established?
 2. How have they evolved, from 1993? Discuss how they relate to the initiatives associated with each legislative long (odd year) sessions.
 3. Who establishes them?
 4. If the process has changed, what caused the changes, how have the changes affected the process?
 5. How does the strategy process (devising a plan from a broad perspective) figure into setting priorities?
 6. How are priorities addressed?
 7. Comment on results from addressing priorities?

- iv. Legislative agendas
 - 1. How are legislative items established?
 - 2. Who establishes them?
 - 3. How have legislative agendas evolved, from 1993?
 - 4. If the process has changed, what caused the changes, how have the changes affected the process?
 - 5. How does the strategy process (devising a plan from a broad perspective) figure into legislative items?
 - 6. How are agenda items addressed?
 - 7. Comment on results from addressing agenda items?

Attachment 3: Grant Scoring Matrices

2008 SCORING ON-LINE CRITERIA GUIDELINES FOR CJI GRANT APPLICATIONS – Based on a standard 100 Point System

Risk/Threat	0-10
Outcomes	0-10
Key Strategies	0-10
Collaboration	0-10
Goals	0-15
Objectives	0-15
Performance Measures	0-15
Evaluation	0-15

Meets Priority:

Does the program meet the express criteria as defined by the GCC and USDOJ.

Needs/Risk Assessment (10 Points)

Does this program demonstrate Crime Risk Assessment (CRA) in their jurisdiction, that is, demonstrated in the way of support from Uniform Crime Reporting Data (UCR), jurisdictional substance abuse statistics, major changes in cultural or ethnic demographics, and a significant past history of under served population and poverty within a particular community.

0-3 points = Low Crime Risk

4-7 points = Moderate Crime Risk

8-10 points = High Crime Risk

Outcomes (10 Points)

This category rates each application on the needs of that area geographically. This would be based on a needs assessment of that particular location. Has the applicant demonstrated a real and actual need for the requested program and did the applicant provide related statistical data to support the project objective?

0-3 points = Little Need

4-7 points = Medium Need

7-10 points = Highest Need

Strategies/Key Elements (10 Points)

This category will evaluate each applicant on how well they will utilize available resources. This category will also evaluate how accountable the agencies will be with the use of these funds.

Does the proposal demonstrate distinct goals, timetables, and quantifiable evaluative measures to monitor growth, progress, and shortfalls within the project?

- 0-3 points = Show no or little accountability
- 4-7 points = Demonstrates some efficiency in utilizing resources and accountability of funds
- 8-10 points = Clearly demonstrates strong fiscal responsibility and sound plan for long term sustainability.

Shows Collaboration (10 Points)

This category would evaluate each applicant on how well they work with other agencies to strengthen their application. These projects will need to work with their neighboring communities and show currently established collaborative partnerships in prevention/law enforcement/treatment programs.

- 0-3 points = No Collaboration
- 4-7 points = Collaboration with one agency
- 8-10 points = Collaboration with multiple agencies

Goals (15 Points)

Does the program provide a reasonable and logical evaluation of its work, client management, training, and tracking process so that governmental funding agencies can accurately identify successful ongoing criminal justice program models and justify future funding of same.

- 0-5 points = No identifiable goal
- 6-10 points = A variety of goals but none identified as primary
- 11-15 points = clearly identifiable primary goal

Objectives (15 Points)

Will this project be an effective program considering the impact of reduced federal funding and the need for state administrating agencies to demonstrate to Congress the need to continue funding local initiatives with federal grants? Does the proposal demonstrate accountability in how these funds are to be spent and high return to the community versus dollars expended.

- 0-5 points = No discernable objectives
- 6-10 points = Generalized statement of overall objectives.
- 11-15 points = Specific objectives and effective plan by which to achieve them

Performance Measures (15 Points)

The standard common performance outcomes for all units must and will be measured in the following manner. Will all data be collected for reporting, documentation, and monitoring so it can be used for evaluation purposes to determine productivity and effectiveness. All statistical and anecdotal information will have to be compiled and analyzed across the various projects for use as the basis for monitoring and strengthening individual projects on an ongoing basis.

- 0-5 points = No methodology presented to acquire data

6-10 points = Shows some measurements and statistical data to be monitored.

11-15 points = Complete tracking system for all aspects of program results and client services

Evaluation (15 Points)

The Governor’s Crime Commission requires every grantee to conduct an evaluation of their project to ensure that it was successful and in compliance with all federal and state regulations. Each funded project’s tracking mechanism is tailored after the approved abstracts that the GCC submits to the Bureau of Justice Assistance annually. Additionally, each project’s goals, objectives, and evaluation methods must be reviewed through a series of periodic written progress reports, client surveys, site visits, and fiscal inspections.

0-5 points = No evaluation criteria present

6-10 points = Shows some general evaluation and statistical data gathering mechanisms

11-15 points = Complete evaluation of program of program results and impact

SCORING CRITERIA FOR 2007 GCC GANG GRANT APPLICATIONS

Meets Priority	Risk/Threat	Suppression	Prevention	Intervention	Collaboration
Yes or No	0-10	0-15	0-25	0-25	0-25

Meets Priority: Does the program meet the express criteria as defined by the GCC and the State Legislature. Yes or No, if no, score this grant as a 0.

Risk/Threat Has this program narrative demonstrated Potential Threat Elements (PTE) in their jurisdiction, that is, demonstrated true gang activity, direct gang related crimes, direct gang involvement or recruitment of youth within that community, and/or the community’s immediate vulnerability to gang violence.

0- points = Low Risk/Threat

1-5 points = Moderate Risk/Threat

5-10 points = High Risk/Threat

Suppression: This category should rate each application on at least one of the following strategies along with sufficient justification to: (1) produce data collection and real-time intelligence; (2) prosecution and enforcement strategies that are developed with the goal of reducing violent gang-related incidents through both reactive; (3) and proactive efforts and may coordinate with federal, state, and local law enforcement.

In addition to these program requirements, all law enforcement applicants must also agree to receive training and participate in GangNet.

0-5 points = Little Need

5-10 points = Medium Need

10-15 points = Highest Need

Prevention: This category should rate each application on clearly identifiable prevention needs, methodology, and definitive goals as laid out in a precise and organized plan of action. Programs must be based upon a data-driven, strategic planning and management process that integrates human and financial resources with a proven strategic framework.

0-10 points = Little Need

11-20 points = Medium Need

21-25 points = Highest Need

Intervention: This category should rate each application on clearly identifiable intervention needs, methodology, and definitive goals as laid out in a precise and organized plan of action. In addition to services and opportunities, intervention must also show distinct and adequate supervision and accountability.

0-10 points = Little Need

11-20 points = Medium Need

21-25 points = Highest Need

Shows Collaboration: This category rates each applicant on how well each one worked with planned partnerships and with other local agencies to strengthen their application. These projects will also need to show that they are willing to work with their neighboring communities in order to promote a true gang prevention/intervention/suppression program.

0 points = No Collaboration

1 - 10 points = Collaboration with one agency

11-25 points = Collaboration with multiple agencies